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objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, under the same conditions on which I have yielded to other Senators, I now yield to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Arkansas for yielding to me. I asked him to yield for the purpose of obtaining unanimous consent to place in the RECORD a transcript of the discussion between the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and two noted Columbia Broadcasting System news correspondents, Mr. Eric Sevareid and Mr. Martin Agronsky. The discussion took place on the CBS Network between 10:30 and 11 o'clock last night, Eastern Standard Time. It was another impressive demonstration of Senator FULBRIGHT's uncommon commonsense.

Much of the discussion centered around the issue of Vietnam, and our policy not only in that country, but in other parts of Asia as well. The discussion was a most thoughtful, interesting, and forthright statement of the issues.

Near the end of the broadcast, Mr. Sevareid asked Senator FULBRIGHT if he thought that high ranking public officials could afford the luxury of public pessimism. Senator FULBRIGHT offered what I believe to be a perfect answer.

He said:

It seems to me that we all get along better if we say what we think, whether it is pessimistic or optimistic.

That is a good admonition to all of us. It is sometimes difficult to speak out on controversial questions, particularly at a time when our country is committed to battle. No one enjoys the prospect of having his words twisted in such a way as to imply that he has somehow undercut what our troops are trying to accomplish or has undercut the national interest in any way. But there has never been a time in our history when plain, honest talk was so desperately needed. And every Senator speaks for war or peace by his silence as well as by his words.

We are involved in what I believe is the most dangerous venture in which this country has ever been engaged. We must turn every possible stone in an effort to end this war and to bring it to a conclusion before we are pulled into what would be the most disastrous development that anyone could imagine, and that is a major all-out war on the Asian mainland.

In my judgment the great generals who have warned us against that in the past have been absolutely right. I believe that it would be calamitous for this country to take steps which would bring on such a war.

I hope that we will do everything we can to prevent that. I believe that the President wants to avoid that kind of a conflict but he needs to hear our honest convictions about this ill-advised venture in Vietnam.

One way to avoid an even larger conflict is by honest talk. If Senators will only speak out and say what they really

MORE COMMONSENSE FROM SENATOR FULBRIGHT

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield to me?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remarks of all the Senators who have preceded me, and to whom I have yielded, precede in the RECORD the remarks I shall make. I should like to preserve the continuity of my remarks. I feel certain that no Senator will object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there

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believe on this issue, it will be far more helpful than if they refrain from saying what is on their conscience and on their minds.

I hope that we may have a thorough discussion not only of the Vietnamese issue, but also of our entire policy in Asia. It is of the utmost importance to us and to our children.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the very thoughtful discussion by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the discussion was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FULBRIGHT: ADVICE AND DISSENT

(CBS News special report, as broadcast on the CBS Television Network and the CBS Radio Network, Feb. 1, 1966)

Guest: The Honorable J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, U.S. Senate, Democrat, of Arkansas.

CBS News correspondents: Eric Sevareid, Martin Agronsky.

Producer: William J. Small.

Director: Robert Vitarelli.

Mr. AGRONSKY. This is room 1215 in the New Senate Office Building, the entrance to the office of the junior Senator from Arkansas. As you enter you see a collection of photographs, autographed by a President from Texas: "To BILL FULBRIGHT, who listens, maybe, perhaps; signed, Lyndon B. Johnson." "To BILL: I can see I haven't been very persuasive; signed, Lyndon B. Johnson."

Tonight an examination of the views of J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, who does listen but is not always persuaded.

ANNOUNCER. From Washington, as part of CBS News' continuing coverage of the Vietnam conflict, "FULBRIGHT: Advice and Dissent," a discussion of foreign policy with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he talks with CBS News Correspondents Eric Sevareid and Martin Agronsky.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Senator, do you feel the course the President is following now in Vietnam is a wise one?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, with respect to the referral to the United Nations, I certainly do, under the circumstances. I think this is the best thing he could do.

I have already expressed my reservations about resuming bombing. I think this is too bad. I wish he had been more patient about resuming bombing. I don't think that helps it. But, any case, he has done that and I don't wish to quarrel about it. I think we have to accept it. But I do approve of going to the United Nations. I know there is much skepticism about it operating, but circumstances have changed since that was last discussed. And I am hopeful, surely, that they will do something in the United Nations.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator FULBRIGHT, you spent a great part of your life studying American foreign policy and the history thereof. We are now suggesting arbitration by others. Has this country ever agreed before in a war to submit to arbitration by others?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't recall it. I must say I wouldn't want to pose as the kind of expert your first statement would pose. I have spent most of my time in public life studying the problems of Arkansas and foreign relations are simply one of my duties. But nevertheless I know of no precedent for that. But I think it is a good one under these circumstances.

It has progressed to the point where we have created the South Vietnamese Government and we are committed to it by reiteration of the word "commitment." I find it very difficult to find any what I call legal commitment through a treaty basis, the

usual kind of commitment, that we have in NATO, for example. I find it very difficult. The explanation that SEATO is the origin of this leaves me very cold. I am very dubious about the validity of these arguments about our commitment. It is a commitment largely by reiteration of the word that we are committed. It is a kind of a self-generating commitment.

But there we are. And, therefore, I have to modify my feeling to the extent that I would like to cooperate in getting out of this. It does me no good, really, to just say we shouldn't have been there. I am trying to explain why there is so much feeling about this that is very unusual under these circumstances.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, do you feel that what President Johnson has been doing in the last year in Vietnam is inconsistent in line with the so-called commitments of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, President Johnson, in all honesty, inherited this situation. It had become quite substantial when he came onto the scene and he was presented with a very difficult situation. There was as many, as I recall it about 20,000 people, of our people there at the time of the Tonkin incident. That is substantial but nothing like now.

I regret that the President ever started the bombing and that much greater effort, this offensive for peace which has just been held—I regret that it wasn't engaged in before we ever became involved. But that is hindsight. I don't wish to be too critical. Goodness knows, that is a difficult job and he did inherit a very difficult situation. And I don't think it is profitable or helpful to be too critical of that period now. And I have to say myself that I have played a part in that that I am not at all proud of, that at the time of the Bay of Tonkin I should have had greater foresight in the consideration of that resolution. That would have been a good time to have precipitated a debate and a reexamination, reevaluation of our involvement. And under the influences that existed then, it was during just the beginning of the presidential campaign.

I was very much a partisan in that campaign for Johnson, for the administration. I disapproved of the statements of Mr. Goldwater and I went along with the urging, I may say, of the administration. I think it is a terrible situation we are in. I am hoping we can find an honorable way out of it. I do not wish to see it escalated into a war. I do not believe in the Secretary's theory that this should be the proper place for a confrontation to destroy forever the idea that the wars of national liberation can succeed. This seems to me not an appropriate place for that. I think that if you are ever going to have it—I hope we don't ever have it. I am not for any confrontation of that sort, by violence. But even if you should have it, this is a very bad place and very bad circumstances. That is why I think this history is significant. We should never have a confrontation where there is any doubt about the justification for our particular part at that time in that particular incident.

Mr. SEVAREID. The Secretary of State, Senator, seems to equate Communist China with Hitler's Germany of the thirties, that is, he feels that this is basically an aggressive force that unless one stops them in the early stage, as in Vietnam now, thinking again of Hitler's course of action, you will end up with a great big war. It will all get out of hand. Do you subscribe to that analogy?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am afraid I do not. I do not. This is a very complicated situation. In the first place, I think we have come to grossly exaggerate, at least the present power, of China to carry a war beyond her borders. I mean, from the logistical point of view, naval, modern weapons and so on. She has great vast armies and it

would be a terrible mistake to invade her, as the Japanese proved and nearly everyone else has proved, I think, and agrees with that.

I do not equate her with Hitler. China has a history that is quite different. Actually, if you want to go into this, I think the Chinese have every reason to hate the West. I mean the history of Western treatment of China beginning, certainly, with the opium war is the most disgraceful period maybe that I can think of in our history. They have all of these furious feelings, hatred for the West.

What we should be doing is to try to find ways to rectify the terrible wrongs that we and nearly all the other Western countries inflicted on China. This is inbred in them. It reminds me a little bit of the feeling of the South after reconstruction, if I may use an illustration. These things get in people's blood. It takes time to get over it. And the Chinese talk very mad. They are very offensive.

But, coming back to Vietnam, I don't want to be too critical of it. As I say, I have admitted I made the mistake. I wasn't conscious of this. I am no expert on this area and perhaps I have no business talking about it. But you have asked me to come here and talk about it and in my position as chairman, I feel I can't refuse. I don't profess to be any great expert on it. When I am asked to say something I feel I ought to. This is more a feeling than it is an intellectual analysis of all these elements. There is much about this I don't know.

When they say only the President has the information to make a decision, in many respects that is right. But we have to give advice. I think the advice that the Constitution contemplated from us is to reflect the common man's feeling about what he does know about these things. My instinct is that the great United States, this enormous powerful country, becoming involved on the basis we did here, and taking it out on a little country of—whatever it is, 14 million people—to prove some vast point of the success of the Communist plot, as they call it, is not very becoming to us. If we want to confront, if we really are confronting China, if this is really a threat, why don't we attack China or Russia and have it out with someone our own size?

Mr. AGRONSKY. You certainly don't advocate that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not, of course I don't. I don't even advocate attacking North Vietnam. I don't at all. I think the whole purport of our policy should be the other way. I think we should try to find—because we can afford this. This business of our prestige to me doesn't appeal at all. If any country could ever afford to withdraw, we will say, or to mediate or conciliate—reconciliating in this case, we can. Nobody is going to think we are a paper tiger because we make a settlement here. After all, Russians have withdrawn in several instances, and nobody thought they were no longer of any account in the war, that they are paper tigers, as they say.

I don't know all the circumstances. They withdrew. They got out of Austria after a long travail. Then they got out of Azerbaijan. They got out of Cuba. Why didn't they stand up and say our prestige is involved. These Americans can't push us around and, by gad, we will have it out. I am glad they did. I think they were wrong in going there. But this has some bearing on it. The United States isn't going to lose—on the contrary, I think we would gain a lot of stature if we were wise and magnanimous in seeking a settlement of this and I hope it will come out of the United Nations.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Senator, the whole thrust of your observation seems to be that we haven't been sincerely seeking a settlement. Do you feel that we have been hypocritical about that?

Continued

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Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, you don't want me to make personal comments about our officials—I don't think that is a proper question for me to say—hypocritical, I question the wisdom and I think this is legitimate always. I mean as a representative of the people of Arkansas, it is my duty, with what little information and judgment I have, to try to use it. And I do question the judgment in this instance. And I think we were misled by this preoccupation with what has been called so often the international conspiracy of communism. And many people still use this, completely ignoring the split between the various countries. They say that is not true. It is just a trick, to trick us and to mislead us. And we have much of that left. And I don't minimize the danger of a country like Russia. The eventual danger—China. And now is the time to try to get this back on the tracks so that when China does become a very powerful country with capacity for aggression beyond her borders, she won't still be of the disposition to do so. That ought to be our objective.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, you say you are questioning only the wisdom of these policies, but you have questioned more than that in the past. You have said in connection with the Dominican intervention that the Government has not been candid with the American people, they haven't come clean with us.

Senator MORSE said the other day that if the files of your Foreign Relations Committee were opened, people would be surprised at what they had, I assume, not been told. How do you feel about this?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, first these are two different ones. I don't want to get generalizing too much. In the case of the Dominican Republic, I think it is very clear that there was a difference in the announced objective of the intervention and the real objective of the intervention. That is the closest that I can think of, being of a diversion between the fact and the stated fact.

In the case of the briefings that have taken place over the years with regard to Vietnam, my best guess is that those who briefed us erroneously were themselves misled and didn't understand the situation. I mean I cannot believe that people like McNamara, who is one of the principal briefers, and Taylor—he is a man I think of the highest integrity. I wouldn't for a moment insinuate that they would try to mislead us. I don't think so. I think they are very fine men. I mean, and I have the greatest respect for them. And I think that for reasons I don't quite understand, what they told us about the situation, the progress of the war did not turn out to be accurate.

Mr. SEVAREID. But, Senator, this raises a very serious kind of permanent question of how our administration actions and conclusions on the facts of any moment to be doublechecked. Maybe the press has failed. You have come in well after the fact on the Dominican Republic and said it was wrong. You have come along now, 18 months after the resolution of the Tonkin Gulf and said that shouldn't have been done that way.

Is there a way that the Senate, for example, can be in at the takeoff—

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is no possible way for the Senate—we can't have a department of our own, a CIA of our own, and all of them. We have six overworked professional staff members on my committee and we have always traditionally relied upon the administration and I think we always will. I don't think it is feasible to do this. And our function isn't to duplicate the State Department and the CIA.

You will recall that there was a great outcry by the administration against certain journalists in Vietnam, saying they were misleading the public.

Well, the journalists proved to be right, I think, by the course of events. The same way in Vietnam—in the Dominican Republic. In my view many of the reports that took place by journalists proved to be more accurate than some of the official reports. I don't know how this happens. Or why.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, what is the advice of the Senate if it is always well after the fact then too late. Then what is wrong with the mechanism.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It isn't much good, I don't think. In many cases we usually go along with the administration, as a say, as a kind of general consensus of the people, I suppose. I can't recall many great contributions made to the foreign policy of this country. I can recall the Senate's action on the League of Nations, which I think was a disaster. And they don't always do right and I may not be correct in my judgment, either. I try to be restrained about it.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Let's pause for a moment and resume the questioning after this message.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Senator FULBRIGHT, North Vietnam has declared today that it will consider any resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and Vietnam is invalid and it insists that we must go back to the 1954 Geneva Conventions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, as a matter of fact I have suggested, as others, that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference under the chairmanship of Great Britain and Russia would be an appropriate way to approach this matter. President Johnson has from time to time stated the Geneva Accords was the basis for negotiation, the starting place, at least, to see if we could reach a settlement. So that if that is the way they wish it and they are willing to participate and the co-chairmen are willing to call it, this would seem to me to be a very good recommendation of the Security Council.

The Security Council, as I understand it, has sort of a free rein to recommend whatever they think might bring these parties together and have a negotiation. So I would see nothing wrong with that. I regret that they refused to come to the U.N. I would prefer now that it has been started that they come to the U.N. and make their own case even if that is the result. But I think it is terrible that they are so contemptuous of the U.N.

I don't approve of that at all. But we are dealing with a fact and if this is the only way to get it, I see nothing particularly wrong because this has been advocated—in fact, we urged the calling, the reconvening of it. And the British, I think, proposed it and I think the Russians refused. This was a year or two ago, if my memory serves me right.

Mr. AGRONSKY. You have repeatedly called for the involvement of the Vietcong. Do you think they should be involved in this instance again?

Senator FULBRIGHT. It would seem to me that this is a purely practical matter, not a theoretical one. They are the army in being. We are told they have somewhere in the neighborhood of 236,000 to 250,000 men which is the corps of the fighting in South Vietnam—so to speak, against the regime which we support, the Ky regime. I would think that they are a proper party to a negotiation because you negotiate over their heads and you arrive at agreements, if they are not involved why they can keep on fighting. And this could be a futile thing.

Mr. AGRONSKY. And you feel that we must accept the Vietcong participation in this thing?

Senator FULBRIGHT. It strikes me that it is necessary because they are the boys doing the fighting. They have the guns, they are

killing our people and that is what you want to stop. If you have a ceasefire, who do you have the ceasefire with? You have it with Hanoi or do you have it with the Vietcong. Who is directly—the theory of the administration seems to be that Hanoi absolutely controls it all. I am not sure that this is clear, that these people that are doing the fighting in the field, I am sure they are allied with them, they are taking advice and orders from General Diem because he is the superior kind of director. But they also have a being of their own. They have representatives abroad. It could well be these people, having tasted some degree of control of their own affairs might like it and they might like to—in fact it might be wise to try to develop a little more division between the Vietcong and Hanoi. I think it might serve our purposes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, the Russians apparently are moving into North Vietnam a little more all the time. Much talk of their putting in sophisticated weapons. They seem to want to get in a position politically between the Chinese and Ho Chi Minh's regime, to become the dominant foreign influence with Hanoi. Isn't it possible that as enough time goes by this war is still in, that settlement really is going to be made between us and the Soviet Union?

Senator FULBRIGHT. They ought to be involved. They are a great power in that area, not only that area but the world, and I think they ought to be involved. And, therefore, I am very much in favor of that. I think it would be a good thing. My guess is—and it is purely a guess, of course—on balance they would rather like to see this settled before it gets out of hand. Why else did they become—inject themselves apparently successfully in the controversy between Pakistan and India. This was, some of our best advisers in professional standards, said that was utterly impossible that the Russians could do anything. It was just a propaganda gesture. But it worked.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator FULBRIGHT, the Secretary of State has said recently that he thinks the world on the whole is further away from the danger of nuclear war than it has been in the past. I take it you don't agree with that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't think human nature has gone through any great change in recent years. I think we are subject to many of the same ills that has afflicted us from the beginning. It is going to take a very major and persistent effort on the part of wise leaders to make a change in these—in the kind of instinct feelings, emotions and so on that have resulted in war before. This is why I have had such great hopes that our country, with this unprecedented economic power, physical power, invulnerable in the sense insofar as you can, except now the nuclear weapons, to so many things that afflicted other countries.

There are no real ambitions for imperialism, although we are accused of it. We might play a real leading role in changing the course of events that lead periodically to these wars. But I don't see any ground for the optimism that you indicate. I didn't know the Secretary thought that. He didn't evidence great optimism before my committee the other day and I didn't realize he felt we were in a much better state than before.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Might the optimism not derive from the Secretary from his feeling that the Russians also want peace?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I don't know. I don't recall his having stated that. I really can't read the mind of the Secretary of State. I think I am not a very good authority there.

Mr. SEVAREID. Isn't it generally true, Senator, that people responsible for the conduct of policy, like the President or the Secretary

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of State, just cannot afford the luxury of public pessimism?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I don't know about that. You see it seems to me that we would all get along better if we say what we think, whether it is pessimistic or optimistic. And I mentioned a moment ago that this thing troubles me about prestige and the nations have always been afflicted with saving face. I can see how a little country which is on the make and hasn't much to support it must be very conscious of its dignity and so on and so on. But our country, it seems to me, can afford to be magnanimous, for a small country cannot afford to, maybe in the eyes of the world. And it is—because we could do things that no other country could do without people thinking we were degenerate or soft or weak or all that sort of thing.

We wouldn't lose faith, in my opinion. We would gain face, in my opinion, if we would act wisely and magnanimously and generously in these situations because we can afford it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator FULBRIGHT, I think we have come to the end of our allotted time here. You have been very patient, very responsive. We would both like to thank you very much.

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ANNOUNCER. FULBRIGHT: Advice and Dissent was part of CBS News' continuing coverage of the Vietnam conflict.

This program was prerecorded and edited under the supervision and control of CBS News.

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